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ABSTRACT 
Three experiments examined human processing of stimuli as predictors and causes. In 
Experiments 1A and 1B, two serial events that both preceded a third were assessed as 
predictors and as causes of the third event. Instructions successfully provided scenarios in 
which one of the serial (target) stimuli was viewed as a strong predictor but as a weak cause of 
the third event. In Experiment 2, participants’ preexperimental knowledge was drawn upon in 
such a way that two simultaneous antecedent events were processed as predictors or causes, 
which strongly influenced the occurrence of overshadowing between the antecedent events. 
Although a tendency toward overshadowing was found between predictors, reliable 
overshadowing was observed only between causes, and then only when the test question was 
causal. Together with other evidence in the human learning literature, the present results 
suggest that predictive and causal learning obey similar laws, but there is a greater  
susceptibility to cue competition in causal than predictive attribution. 
  
This paper examines differences between predictive 
and causal learning in humans. Events often occur in our 
environment according to a consistent temporal distribution. 
Some events occur simultaneously (e.g., the sound 
and sight of water running out of the tap), whereas other 
events occur sequentially (e.g., hunger dissipates after 
the intake of food). When the events repeatedly take 
place following a sequential distribution in time, the first 
event (i.e., the antecedent event) can become a signal for 
the occurrence of the second event (i.e., the subsequent 
event). Learning to predict the occurrence of an event on 
the basis of the occurrence of another event is essential 
for survival. For instance, we can learn to anticipate 
when and where food or water will be available, as well 
as which situations can potentially result in physical injuries 
or social reward or punishment. By learning to anticipate 
the occurrence of significant events, we can 
modify our behavior to maximize or minimize the consequences 
of appetitive or aversive events, respectively. 
But, under some conditions, we can learn that the antecedent 
event is not only a predictor, but also a cause of 
the subsequent event. Causal learning can be even more 
important than predictive learning. First, a cause is always 
a predictor of the event, so that causal learning 
might be expected to include and perhaps depend on predictive 
learning. Second, by knowing the causes of the 
event, we can not only anticipate the occurrence of the 
event, but also potentially control its occurrence. For example, 
we can learn to establish a comfortable temperature 
in a room by manipulating the thermostat, or we can 
learn that ingestion of a certain food produces an allergic 
reaction, in which case we will try to avoid that food 
in the future. Therefore, whereas predictive learning al- 
lows us to modify our behavior in order to adapt to the 
impending presence or absence of an event, causal learning 
also allows us to use our own behavior to produce or 
prevent the occurrence of an event. 
 
The systematic study of causal learning by humans 
within an associative framework began two decades ago 
with a study by Dickinson, Shanks, and Evenden (1984). 
They reported blocking, an effect first found in classical 
conditioning with nonhuman animals (Kamin, 1968). 
Conventionally, in a blocking design, a conditioned stimulus 
(CS), A, is first paired with an unconditioned stimulus 
(US) and then CS A is further paired with the US in 
the presence of an added CS, X. At test, CS X elicits a 
weak response, relative to a control condition in which 
CS A was not paired with the US prior to the AX–US 
pairings. In the experiments by Dickinson et al., no actual 
CSs or USs were presented. Rather, the participants 
were exposed to neutral stimuli in a computer-based task 
resembling a video game and were instructed to rate the 
causal efficacy of an artillery shell being fired (analogous 
to a blocked CS X) in destroying a tank (analogous 
to a US). Additionally, a mine exploding (analogous to 
blocking a CS A) could also destroy the tank. 
 
The relevance of the Dickinson et al. (1984) study to 
the area of human associative learning was twofold. 
First, as previously mentioned, these authors replicated 
the blocking effect with humans in a preparation in 
which (1) the fictitious stimuli were affectively neutral, 
and (2) the dependent variable used to assess the strength 
of the association between the candidate blocked cause, 
and the effect consisted of a verbal judgment (i.e., a numerical 
rating; see also Allan & Jenkins, 1983; Alloy & 
Abramson, 1979). Thus, this study showed that causal 
learning by humans, as in classical conditioning of nonhuman 
animals, is subject to the blocking effect. Second, 
this observation suggests that, regardless of the differences 
in species and preparations, the same mechanisms 
may be involved in conditioning and causal learning. As 
a logical consequence of this correspondence between 
conditioning and causal learning, Dickinson et al. (see 
also Gluck & Bower, 1988; Shanks & Dickinson, 1987) 
proposed that the associative theories developed to explain 
classical conditioning in nonhuman animals (e.g., 
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) could also be used to account 
for causal learning by humans. 
 
Dickinson et al.’s (1984) study greatly stimulated the 
study of stimulus competition in humans within an associative 
framework. Stimulus competition effects, such 
as the above-mentioned blocking effect (Kamin, 1968), 
overshadowing (Pavlov, 1927), and relative stimulus validity 
effect (Wagner, Logan, Haberlandt, & Price, 1968) 
were initially found in experiments using nonhuman animals 
and then successfully replicated using predictive 
or causal judgment preparations with humans (for a 
demonstration of overshadowing, see Waldmann, 2001; 
for demonstrations of relative stimulus validity effect, 
see Kao & Wasserman, 1993; Matute, Arcediano, & 
Miller, 1996; Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994). These 
studies of stimulus competition in human contingency 
learning demonstrated that, as in conditioning experiments 
with animals, responding to a target stimulus does 
not depend only on the number and quality of pairings 
with the outcome or US (i.e., contiguity), but also on the 
associative status of any other stimuli that were present 
during training of the target stimulus. According to different 
theoretical approaches, stimuli compete either to enter 
into an association with the outcome (e.g., Rescorla & 
Wagner, 1972) or to express their previously acquired association 
with the outcome (e.g., Miller & Matzel, 1988). 
Thus, by replicating effects previously found in nonhuman 
animals, the study of stimulus competition became a critical 
issue in the human associative learning literature. 
However, transfer between the animal conditioning and 
human associative learning literatures has not been unidirectional 
(see Miller & Matute, 1996, for a detailed 
discussion). Some effects originally found in humans 
were also replicated in classical conditioning with nonhuman 
animals. This is the case for backward blocking, 
an effect akin to forward blocking but with the order of 
the training phases reversed. That is, AX–US pairings 
are followed by A–US pairings, and then responding to 
X is assessed. This effect was originally reported by 
Shanks (1985) in humans and then replicated in rats by 
Denniston, Miller, and Matute (1996). 
 
The study of stimulus competition has attracted a large 
number of researchers and theorists in the area of human 
contingency learning, especially over the last two decades 
(see De Houwer & Beckers, 2002, for a recent review). 
Two main paradigms have been commonly used indiscriminately 
in these studies: predictive and causal learning. 
In the predictive learning paradigm, participants are 
asked to rate the predictive relationship between a target 
antecedent event, normally referred to as cue or signal (or 
even predictor or indicator), and a subsequent event, referred 
to as the outcome (O). In the causal learning paradigm, 
participants are asked to rate the causal relationship 
between the antecedent and subsequent events, 
which are normally referred to as cause and effect, respectively. 
Evidence of stimulus competition, mostly forward 
and backward blocking, has been reported in both 
the predictive and causal learning paradigms. 
 
Although the study of predictive and causal learning 
in humans has received extensive attention, researchers 
have largely ignored possible differences between these 
two kinds of learning. Certainly there were almost no systematic 
comparisons of these two learning paradigms. 
The only exception to this was provided by De Houwer, 
Beckers, and Glautier (2002), who studied predictive 
and causal learning in both forward and backward blocking 
paradigms. In the causal conditions of their experiments 
(i.e., Condition Weapons), the participants were 
asked to rate the likelihood that firing a weapon would 
be followed by destruction of a tank (i.e., the outcome), 
whereas in the predictive conditions (i.e., Condition Indicators), 
they were asked to rate the likelihood of the 
destruction of the tank when an abstract visual figure 
was present. De Houwer et al. found both forward and 
backward blocking in the causal condition, but no stimulus 
competition in the predictive condition, which they 
interpreted as suggesting that stimulus competition depends 
on the causal nature of the stimuli. 
 
Other studies have systematically manipulated the type 
of test questions (i.e., predictive or causal) in experiments 
in which the task is consistently embedded in what is 
clearly a causal scenario. For example, Matute, Vegas, and 
De Marez (2002; see also Vadillo, Miller, & Matute, 
2005) used a variation of the allergy task (Gluck & Bower, 
1988; Wasserman, 1990), in which the task of the participants 
was to rate the relationship between the ingestion of 
some substances (foods or medicines) and the development 
of fictitious allergies. Therefore, Matute et al. (2002) 
did not directly contrast predictors and causes per se, but 
rather the effect of different test questions concerning a 
potential cause. That is, in contrast to De Houwer et al. 
(2002), who contrasted predictors and causes but did not 
manipulate the type of test question, Matute et al. (2002) 
exclusively focused on the study of causal learning and 
manipulated the type of test question. Because these prior 
studies assessed the impact of either the type of stimuli 
(De Houwer et al., 2002) or the type of test question (Matute 
et al., 2002), an integrative assessment of the interaction 
of the type of stimuli (i.e., predictors vs. causes) and 
type of test question (i.e., predictive vs. causal) in a single 
study seemed necessary. Note that there are several different 
types of predictive questions that can be asked (see 
Vadillo et al., 2005). For brevity and because we used only 
one type of predictive question, we will refer to it simply 
as the predictive question, although it is highly similar to 
the predictive-value question of Vadillo et al. (2005) as 
opposed to what they called their prediction question. 
 
In order to compare predictive and causal learning in 
a single experiment, at least three approaches could be 
followed. The first approach consists of using different 
scenarios (provided by the instructions) in the predictive 
and causal conditions. For example, the stock market 
task used by Chapman and Robbins (1990; see also Chapman, 
1991), in which the participants are required to predict 
the behavior of the real estate market on the basis of 
changes in the price of stock for a fictitious electronics 
company, could be used in the predictive condition, 
whereas the allergy task (Wasserman, 1990) could be used 
in the causal condition. The problem with this approach is 
that it relies upon comparisons among groups differing 
appreciably in procedural aspects (e.g., instructions, set 
of stimuli, test questions, and rating scales). A second 
approach consists of using different instructions with the 
same scenario to encourage the processing of the relations 
as either predictive or causal, an approach that was 
followed by De Houwer et al. (2002). The third strategy 
consists of taking advantage of the participant’s preexperimental 
knowledge of predictive and causal relations. 
For example, in the allergy task, participants are expected 
to process the intake of a medicine as a cause of the allergic 
reaction, whereas the color of a flask containing a 
medicine would be processed as a potential predictor. 
 
Our present experiments used either different wording 
of instructions (Experiments 1A and 1B) or participants’ 
preexperimental knowledge (Experiment 2), in order to 
study and contrast predictive and causal learning. 
Specifically, in Experiments 1A and 1B, the scenario had 
two antecedent events occur serially in time and then followed 
by the outcome (i.e., Stimulus 1 [S1] was followed 
by Stimulus 2 [S2], and S2 was followed by O). However, 
the instructions were worded so that both S2 and O 
were seemingly effects of S1. The purpose of Experiment 
1 was simply to demonstrate that a single stimulus 
(S2 in this case) could simultaneously assume different 
values as a predictor and as a cause of O. In Experiment 
2, we used the training scenario to make two antecedent 
events either predictive or causal and then studied 
overshadowing between these events. The central 
issue in Experiment 2 was whether predictors and causes 
were differentially sensitive to overshadowing. The participants’ 
preexperimental knowledge of the causal 
structure of the events was used to determine whether the 
training scenario was predictive or causal. 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENTS 1A AND 1B 
 
Experiments 1A and 1B examined the influence of the 
cover story provided within the instructions on the processing 
of stimuli as either predictors or causes of a subsequent 
stimulus. Although the antecedent stimuli (S1 
and S2) and the subsequent stimulus (O) used in these 
experiments were simultaneously presented on the computer 
screen during each treatment trial, the instructions 
clearly indicated that the stimuli occurred serially. 
Specifically, according to the instructions, S1 was followed 
by S2, and then S2 was followed by O (see the top 
panel of Figure 1). In addition to the temporal priority of 
S1 over S2, the instructions encouraged processing of S1 
as a common cause of both S2 and O (i.e., the presentation 
of S1 first S2 and then O; see bottom panel of Figure 
1). On the basis of these causal relations suggested 
by the instructions, we anticipated the S1 would be perceived 
as both a predictor and a cause of O. But how 
would S2 be perceived with respect to O? Cohen, Rundell, 
Spellman, and Cashon (1999) demonstrated that, in 
causal-chain sequences (i.e., S1→S2→O), the first 
causal agent in the sequence (i.e., S1) is usually regarded 
as the only cause of O. Although in Experiments 1A and 
1B the instructions were not designed to suggest a causal 
chain (i.e., in our experiments, the instructions suggested 
independent S1→S2 and S1→O causal relations, instead 
of a single S1→S2→O causal chain), on the basis of 
their findings, we expected (1) high predictive and 
causal ratings for S1 with respect to O, and (2) high predictive 
ratings and low causal ratings for S2 with respect 
to O. Although this result would be unsurprising, it 
would provide, if observed, a clear demonstration of the 
impact of a cover story in producing divergent predictive 
and causal processing of a single stimulus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants and Apparatus. Twenty-two undergraduate students 
from the State University of New York at Binghamton participated 
in Experiment 1A and 16 participated in Experiment 1B. The 
participants received either credits in partial fulfillment of a course 
requirement or $5 for participating in these experiments. The experiments 
were conducted using personal computers in individual 
cubicles. 
 
Procedure. The instructions for each scenario are provided in the 
Appendix. At the beginning of the experiment, all the participants 
were reminded of the difference between a predictor and a cause 
(see first screen of instructions in the Appendix). Four different scenarios 
were used in Experiments 1A and 1B. All participants were 
exposed to all four scenarios, counterbalanced for order.1 In Scenario 
1, S1 consisted of “the gun being fired,” S2 consisted of “the 
shell being ejected,” and O was “the target being hit.” In Scenario 2, 
S1 consisted of “imperfect steel sheets,” S2 was “the alarm being 
sounded,” and O was “defective bumpers being produced.” In Scenario 
3, S1 consisted of “the switch being turned,” S2 consisted of 
“the floor being wet,” and O was “the flowers blooming.” In Scenario 
4, S1 consisted of “workers loading strawberries,” S2 consisted 
of “red stained shoes,” and O was “workers wheezing.” In 
each of these text-based scenarios, the participants were requested 
to read the instructions, pay attention to the training trials, and rate 
the predictive and causal value of the S1-O and S2-O relations at the 
end of training for that scenario. For each scenario, the participants 
were given 20 training trials in which S1, S2, and O could be either 
present or absent, with the restriction that no presentation of S1 occurred 
without the presentation of S2, and vice versa. Thus, the contingencies 
of O with respect to S1 and S2 were identical. Following 
training and testing with each of the first three scenarios, the participants 
were instructed: “You will now be learning about a new 
situation. What you previously learned is unrelated to this new situation. 
Please press the enter key to begin.” 
 
In Experiment 1A, 14 S1-S2-O trials, 0 S1-S2-noO trials, 2 
noS1-noS2-O trials, and 4 noS1-noS2-noO trials were presented 
during training. This resulted in a contingency (i.e., as calculated by 
the unconditional ΔP, Allan, 1980) of .67 for both the S1-O and S2- 
O relations. In Experiment 1B, the same number of each trial type 
as in Experiment 1A was administered during training in two of the 
four scenarios (i.e., high contingency). In the other two scenarios 
(i.e., zero contingency), the participants received 8 S1-S2-O trials, 
2 S1-S2-noO trials, 8 noS1-noS2-O trials, and 2 noS1-noS2-noO 
trials, resulting in a contingency of .00 for both the S1-O and S2-O 
relations. The two types of contingencies were presented in counterbalanced 
order and also were counterbalanced across the different 
cover stories. The use of two contingencies allowed us to determine 
whether participants were sensitive to the training contingencies or 
merely responding on the basis of the instructions. The different trial 
types were pseudorandomly distributed across training, with the restriction 
that the first trial was always an S1-S2-O trial, and that no 
more than three trials of the same type occurred consecutively. A 1- 
sec pause was introduced between trials, during which the computer 
screen remained blank. On each trial, the stimuli (S1, S2, O) were 
presented simultaneously in a horizontal sequence on the screen. 
Each stimulus was followed by a question mark and the presence or 
absence of each stimulus was denoted by the presentation of “yes” 
or “no” below the corresponding stimulus. Participants were able to 
advance to the next trial at their own pace by pressing the space bar, 
but only after the stimuli had been presented for at least 2 sec. 
At the end of the training phase of each scenario, the participants 
were asked to rate the predictive and causal relationships between 
S1 and O, and between S2 and O. Importantly, the predictive and 
causal questions differed only in the words predictor and cause, 
presented in uppercase. The predictive/causal test questions were as 
follows: “To what degree do you think that [S1 or S2] was a [PREDICTOR 
or CAUSE] of [O]?” The four test questions were presented 
together on the computer screen, counterbalanced for vertical 
order across participants. The participants could read all four of 
the questions before answering any of them, as well as answer them 
in any order. A rating scale was displayed below each test question. 
This scale ranged from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very high). An alpha 
level of p < .05 was adopted for all statistical analyses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
A preliminary 4 (scenario) x 2 (stimulus: S1 vs. S2) 
x 2 (test question: predictive vs. causal) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) on the test ratings of Experiment 1A 
showed no main effect of scenario, nor any interaction 
involving scenario (all ps > .19). Therefore, the results 
of Experiment 1A were pooled across scenarios for each 
participant. These results are depicted in Figure 2. As 
can be seen, S1 was highly rated, as expected, as both a 
predictor and a cause of O. S2 was given a low rating as 
a cause of O; however, the predictive ratings of S2 were 
higher than its causal ratings and similar to the predictive 
ratings of S1. These impressions were confirmed by a 2 
(stimulus: S1 vs. S2) x 2 (test question: predictive vs. 
causal) ANOVA on the test ratings pooled from all four 
scenarios, which yielded main effects of stimulus 
[F(1,21) = 41.05, MSe = 276.80, p < .001] and test 
question [F(1,21) = 31.19, MSe = 364.60, p < .001], as 
well as a stimulus x test question interaction [F(1,21) = 
76.04, MSe=178.85, p < .001]. The source of this interaction 
was further examined using the Tukey test, which 
showed that the predictive and causal ratings of S1 did 
not differ. However, the causal ratings of S2 were lower 
than its predictive ratings. Also, the predictive ratings of 
S1 and S2 did not differ, but the causal rating of S2 was 
lower than that of S1. Thus, whereas S1 was rated as both 
a reliable predictor and a cause of O, S2 was highly rated 
as a predictor, but not as a cause of O. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Experiment 1B, again there was no main effect or 
interaction with scenario; hence, data were pooled across 
scenarios for otherwise equivalent conditions. The results 
of Experiment 1B are depicted in Figure 3. As can 
be seen, the predictive and causal ratings of S1 and S2 in 
Condition High replicated those of Experiment 1A (i.e., 
high predictive and causal ratings of S1, and predictive 
ratings of S2 higher than its causal ratings). Also, the ratings 
were apparently sensitive to the contingencies. The 
ratings were lower in Condition Zero (bottom panel) than 
in Condition High (top panel). A pattern of results similar 
to that observed in Condition High was also found in 
Condition Zero. Most of these impressions were confirmed 
by a 2 (contingency: high vs. zero) x 2 (stimulus: 
S1 vs. S2) x 2 (test question: predictive vs. causal) 
ANOVA on the test ratings, which showed main effects of 
contingency [F(1,15)=36.16, MSe=660.37, p <.001], 
stimulus [F(1,15)=29.60, MSe=408.02, p <.001], and 
test question [F(1,15)=17.28, MSe=344.90, p <.001]. 
More important, this ANOVA also revealed a stimulus x 
test question interaction [F(1,15) =22.90, MSe = 
306.79, p <.001] and a three-way interaction [F(1,15)= 
5.45, MSe = 304.78, p <.05]. The remaining interactions 
were not significant (ps > .15). Post hoc comparisons 
using the Tukey test on the data from Condition High 
revealed results similar to those of Experiment 1A. These 
comparisons showed that the predictive and causal ratings 
of S1 did not differ, and that the causal ratings of S2 were 
lower than its predictive ratings. Also, the predictive ratings 
of S1 and S2 did not differ, but the causal rating of S2 
was lower than the causal rating of S1. In Condition Zero, 
post hoc comparisons using the Tukey test showed that, as 
in Condition High, the predictive and causal ratings of S1 
did not differ. However, contrary to Condition High, in 
Condition Zero the causal and predictive ratings of S2 did 
not statistically differ, despite the tendency being in the 
same direction as in Condition High. Also, the causal ratings 
of S2 were lower than those of S1, whereas the predictive 
ratings of S2 and S1 did not differ. 
 
Overall, these results show that, with a moderately high 
positive contingency (i.e., ∆P =.67, Experiment 1A and 
Condition High in Experiment 1B), S1 was highly rated as 
both a predictor and cause of Stimulus O, whereas S2 was 
highly rated as a predictor, but not as a cause of O. In other 
words, the instructions concerning causal mechanisms, 
which encouraged the processing of S2 as a mere predictor 
and S1 as a cause of O, yielded differential predictive 
and causal value of the stimuli despite their having identical 
contingencies with respect to O. 
 
Although the results of Experiments 1A and 1B suggest 
that the causal mechanisms implicit in the scenarios 
favored processing of stimuli as either a predictor or a 
cause, overshadowing of S2 by S1 based on the temporal 
priority of S1 could provide an alternative explanation 
of the observed results. That is, the serial presentation 
of S1 and S2 engendered in the instructions could 
have allowed for these stimuli to compete with one another 
for the acquisition of the predictive and causal 
value. Because Experiments 1A and 1B did not include 
a control condition for overshadowing (i.e., a condition 
in which S2 was trained with the outcome in the absence 
of S1), these experiments do not permit distinguishing 
between causal mechanism and temporally based stimulus 
competition as the basis for S2 being rated as a strong 
predictor and a weak cause. Therefore, although the 
cover stories provided by the instructions in Experiments 
1A and 1B seemingly produced differential processing 
of S2 as a predictor and as a cause, the role 
played in the present results by participants’ preexperimental 
knowledge concerning predictive and causal relationships 
in the real world is unclear. Experiment 2 was 
designed to eliminate the serial relationship of the antecedent 
events, among other things. 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
The results of Experiments 1A and 1B suggested that 
either temporal priority or the participants’ preexperimental 
knowledge of the predictive and causal relations 
established by the fictitious scenarios favored processing 
of the target stimulus, S2, more as a predictor than as 
cause. Experiment 2 also assessed predictive and causal 
values of a stimulus, but this time we assessed overshadowing 
between simultaneous antecedent stimuli. 
 
Overshadowing was separately assessed between predictors 
(i.e., Group P) and between causes (i.e., Group C). 
Unlike Experiments 1A and 1B, in Experiment 2 the simultaneous 
occurrence of the two antecedent events precluded 
temporal order from possibly contributing to differentiation 
between predictors and causes. Instead, 
differentiation between predictors and causes was provided 
exclusively by the participants’ preexperimental 
knowledge of predictive and causal relations in the real 
world. Thus, any differences in overshadowing observed 
between predictors and between causes would presumably 
be due to differences in the sensitivity of predictors 
and causes to associative competition. 
 
In Experiment 2 the instructions contained no explicit 
information concerning the role of the stimuli as predictors 
or causes. All participants were given a common set 
of instructions that was neutral regarding the causal/ 
predictive nature of the task in order to minimize the influence 
of instructions on ratings as a function of their 
being predictive or causal. The participants’ task was to 
take a fictitious test for a position in the National 
Weather Service. For all the participants, the outcome 
consisted of the occurrence of a thunderstorm. However, 
different antecedent stimuli were presented to Groups P 
and C. In Group P the stimuli consisted of instances of 
animal behavior (e.g., birds flying in circles), whereas in 
Group C the stimuli consisted of variations in the climatic 
conditions (e.g., sudden change of temperature). 
Although both types of stimuli were clearly correlates of 
the subsequent occurrence of a thunderstorm, the stimuli 
were expected to be processed as mere predictors of 
the thunderstorm in Group P, and as causes of the thunderstorm 
in Group C. 
 
In Experiments 1A and 1B, S1 (an implicit cause of O) 
might have overshadowed the causal value of S2 (the target 
stimulus), but there was no control condition to assess 
overshadowing. Experiment 2 investigated whether 
the causal value and predictive value of stimuli are subject 
to overshadowing by other causes and by other predictors, 
respectively, relative to appropriate overshadowing 
control conditions. In Experiment 2, participants 
received training with two implicit causes or two implicit 
predictors (i.e., Stimuli A and X) presented in 
compound, as well as a control condition for overshadowing 
(i.e., Stimulus Y). All participants were asked 
both predictive and causal test questions in order to ascertain 
whether overshadowing of the predictive or 
causal value of a predictor (i.e., Group P) or of a cause 
(i.e., Group C) could be observed. As in Experiments 1A 
and 1B, the predictive and causal test questions differed 
only in one word (i.e., predictor vs. cause). 
 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants and Apparatus. The participants were 74 students 
in an introductory psychology course at the State University of 
New York at Binghamton, who participated in this experiment in 
partial fulfillment of a course requirement. The participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two groups (ns = 37). 
 
Procedure. The task used in Experiment 2 simulated a computer-based 
test that the participants had to take as part of a fictitious application 
for the National Weather Service.[2] At the beginning of the 
experiment, all participants were presented with a screen of instructions 
(see the Appendix). Immediately after they had read the 
instructions, training commenced. 
 
During training, the participants were given 5 AX-O and 5 Y-O 
trials, in pseudorandom order. In Group P, Stimuli A, X, and Y consisted 
of the presentation of the text “Birds flying in circles,” “Dogs 
barking,” and “Squirrels returning to nests,” counterbalanced. In 
Group C, these stimuli consisted of the presentation of the text “Fall 
of atmospheric pressure,” “Sudden change of temperature,” and 
“High humidity,” counterbalanced. The O consisted of the presentation 
of the text “Thunderstorm: Intensity = 10 out of 20.”[3] 
After each trial and before the interval separating it from the subsequent 
trial, the participants were required to indicate whether the 
stimuli (i.e., A, X, Y, and O) were present or absent on that specific 
trial. In this screen, the following instructions were presented: 
“Please, indicate whether the following events were present or absent 
on this occasion.” All of the stimuli were presented in a vertical 
list format on each trial, counterbalanced for order, together 
with a box labeled “This event was . . . ,” containing the following 
two options: “Present” and “Absent.” The participants were asked 
to use the computer mouse to indicate the presence or absence of 
each stimulus before they were allowed to proceed to the next trial; 
they received no feedback concerning their answers. The purpose 
of this posttrial test was twofold. First, it encouraged the participants 
to pay close attention to the events. Second, it provided a criterion 
to eliminate those participants who did not pay sufficient attention 
during training. In order for a participant’s data to be 
retained in the analyses, she/he had to correctly indicate the presence 
or absence of all the stimuli on at least two trials among Trials 
2–5 of AX-O and two trials among Trials 2–5 of Y-O (i.e., they 
were always allowed to fail in the first AX-O and Y-O trials because 
this first test was expected to increase attention to stimuli on subsequent 
trials). The application of this criterion eliminated 17 participants 
(8 from Group P and 9 from Group C). 
 
During testing, the participants were presented with predictive 
and causal questions concerning the A-O, X-O, and Y-O associations. 
The predictive and causal questions read as follows: “To what 
degree do you think that [A or X or Y] is a [PREDICTOR or 
CAUSE] of thunderstorms?” All six of the test questions were presented 
on a single screen. The order of presentation of the test questions 
corresponding to a physical stimulus (e.g., dogs barking) was 
identical for all participants. However, because of the complete 
counterbalancing of the assignment of these text labels to the different 
stimuli (i.e., A, X, and Y), the order of presentation of the test 
questions of the stimuli was counterbalanced. Also, the predictive 
and causal test questions were presented in a counterbalanced order 
(i.e., all predictive first or all causal first). The participants were requested 
to answer each question by rating the different predictive 
and causal relations using a scale ranging from -10 to + 10. A 
brief note at the top of the screen explained the meaning of the extreme 
and middle values of the scale as well as how to indicate the 
rating: “In order to answer, use any number in the scale from -10 
to + 10, where -10 = Not at all, 0 = Not sure, and + 10 = Very 
high. Click on the vertical arrows to indicate your rating. Please 
read ALL of the questions before you answer any of them.” The current 
rating to each question could be viewed in a small window to 
the right of the corresponding question. This rating, which was initially 
set at 0, could be changed by clicking on one of two arrows 
(up or down). Clicking on the up or down arrows yielded a +-1 increment 
or decrement, respectively, in the rating. Once the participants 
had rated the different predictive and causal relations, they 
had to click on a button labeled “Save my ratings” in order to proceed 
to the next screen. 
 
Following testing, the participants were given a short quiz in 
order to assess their ability to differentiate prediction from causality. 
This quiz consisted of three multiple choice questions, which 
read as follows: “Question 1: Firing a gun is _____ by the pulling 
of its trigger”; “Question 2: A train coming is _____ by a flashing 
red light at a railroad crossing”; and “Question 3: High tides are 
_____ by singing pop songs.” For each question, the participants 
had to choose among the following three answers: “predicted,” 
“caused,” “neither predicted nor caused.” The correct answers for 
Questions 1, 2, and 3 were “caused,” “predicted,” and “neither predicted 
nor caused,” respectively. Participants who failed to answer 
all the questions correctly were removed from the analyses. Among 
the participants who passed the attentional criterion (i.e., correctly 
indicating the presence or absence of all the stimuli on at least two 
of each type of training trial), 5 participants (i.e., 2 and 3 participants 
from Groups P and C, respectively) failed to pass the present 
criterion. Thus, after the participants that did not pass both criteria 
were eliminated, the resulting sample of participants in each group 
was 27 for Group P and 25 for Group C. 
 
Prior to analysis, the ratings of Stimuli A and X were averaged 
to obtain a single rating for stimuli trained in compound (i.e., 
Comp). Pooling the ratings of Stimuli A and X was justified on the 
basis of the complete counterbalancing of the stimuli and was performed 
in order to reduce variability of the ratings. The ratings of 
Stimulus Y directly represented the ratings of the elementally 
trained stimulus (i.e., Elem). Therefore, Stimuli Comp and Elem 
hereafter will represent the different training conditions received 
by Stimuli A and X (i.e., compound training) and Stimulus Y (i.e., 
elemental training). 
 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The order of presentation of the predictive and causal 
questions at test was found to influence the test results. 
Thus, in order to minimize the influence of the order of 
presentation of the predictive and causal test questions 
on the test results, we performed the analyses exclusively 
on the ratings corresponding to the first test question 
asked concerning each stimulus. After the second ratings 
were eliminated, the sample for predictive ratings consisted 
of 14 participants for each of Groups P and C and 
the sample for causal ratings consisted of 13 participants 
for Group P and 11 participants for Group C. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 depicts the results of Experiment 2. As can be 
seen, overshadowing (i.e., lower ratings of Stimulus Comp 
than of Stimulus Elem) was suggested in Group P (top 
panel) with the predictive ratings and in Group C (bottom 
panel) with both the predictive and the causal ratings. 
Also, overshadowing was apparently stronger in Group C 
(as assessed by the causal ratings) than in Group P (as assessed 
by the predictive ratings). These impressions were 
partially supported by a 2 (type of stimuli: P vs. C) x 2 
(test question: predictive vs. causal) x 2 (training condition: 
Comp vs. Elem) ANOVA on the judgmental ratings. 
This ANOVA yielded main effects of type of stimuli 
[F(1,48)=5.40, MSe=32.71, p <.05], test question 
[F(1,48) = 34.10, MSe = 32.71, p < .01], and training 
condition [F(1,48) =20.79, MSe = 5.55, p <.01]. More 
importantly, there were significant interactions: type of 
stimuli x test question [F(1,48) = 4.62, MSe = 32.71, 
p_.05], type of stimuli x training condition [F(1,48)= 
17.43, MSe =5.55, p _.01], and a three-way interaction 
[F(1,48) = 18.41, MSe = 5.55, p < .01]. Post hoc comparisons 
using the Tukey test indicated overshadowing 
(i.e., lower ratings of Comp than Elem) in Group C, as 
assessed by the causal ratings. Despite the tendency toward 
overshadowing in the predictive ratings in both 
Groups P and C suggested by Figure 4, post hoc comparisons 
showed no significant difference between the 
predictive ratings of Comp and Elem in either Group P 
or Group C. It is a little difficult to appreciate the criti- 
cal differences in Figure 4. Consequently, we converted 
the ratings of Stimuli Comp and Elem into overshadowing 
scores (i.e., Overshadowing Scores = Rating Elem 
-- Rating Comp). Figure 5 depicts these overshadowing 
scores for the predictive and causal test questions in 
Groups P and C. Consistent with the previous statistical 
analysis, overshadowing is seen to be stronger in the 
causal ratings of Group C than in the predictive ratings 
of both Groups C and P. 
 
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The present series of experiments used two techniques 
to assess the processing of stimuli as predictors or 
causes. In Experiments 1A and 1B, two stimuli (i.e., S1 
and S2) identically covaried with the presentation of a 
third stimulus (i.e., O). However, the instructions used in 
these experiments promoted the processing of S1 as a 
cause of both O and S2 (see Figure 1). The results of 
these experiments showed, perhaps unsurprisingly but 
now in a controlled manner, that although S2 was rated 
as a poor cause of O, its predictive value was high. However, 
Experiments 1A and 1B raised the question of 
whether the impaired causal value of S2 was exclusively 
due to the instructions having created a bias against the 
processing of S2 as a cause of O or, instead, Stimulus S1 
having overshadowed S2 as a cause but not as a predictor, 
or a combination of these two factors. 
 
Experiment 2 assessed whether overshadowing could 
occur in a similar preparation, but one in which the instructions 
did not identify one antecedent event as a 
cause and the other as a predictor. Instead, the role of the 
stimuli as predictors or causes was manipulated using 
participants’ preexperimental knowledge and, orthogonally, 
both the predictive and the causal value of the stimuli 
were assessed during testing. This experiment used a 
single scenario and a common O for both the predictive 
and causal conditions, and manipulated the predictive and 
causal relations by varying the kind of antecedent stimuli 
presented in each condition. The participants’ preexperimental 
knowledge concerning the different stimulus–O 
relations as either predictive or causal made the scenario 
predictive or causal, respectively. This approach allowed 
us to discount alternative explanations of differences in 
processing of predictors and causes based on the wording 
of the instructions (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2002). Consistent 
with many other reports in the literature (e.g., 
Waldmann, 2001), Experiment 2 showed overshadowing 
between causes (i.e., Group C) as assessed by the causal 
test question, but not as assessed by the predictive test 
question. Moreover, overshadowing was not found between 
predictors (i.e., Group P), as assessed by either the 
predictive or causal test questions. However, a nonsignificant 
tendency toward overshadowing was observed 
in the predictive ratings of predictors and causes. 
Analogously, a nonsignificant difference in the opposite 
direction was found in the causal ratings of predictors. 
But we hesitate to even speculate concerning what this 
might suggest because the meaning of negative causal 
ratings is unclear in our preparation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The present results were observed despite our using 
nearly identical wording of the predictive and causal 
questions in Experiments 1A and 1B, as well as in Experiment 
2, in order to avoid unnecessary differences between 
test questions. Because of this, the predictive question 
might have been expected to resemble the causal 
question in many aspects, such as for example its stimulating 
a comparison between the predictive value of the 
target stimulus and any other candidate predictor, thereby 
heightening its sensitivity to the impact of the predictive 
value of other stimuli (i.e., stimulus competition). In 
summary, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that responding 
based on causal learning is a more selective 
process than is responding based on predictive learning. 
This higher sensitivity of causes to competition does not 
imply that predictors do not compete. Although Experiment 
2 revealed no significant overshadowing between 
predictors (i.e., Group P, predictive ratings), a tendency 
toward overshadowing was found. Also, it is important to 
remember that stimulus competition effects have been 
reported in the literature, not only among causes, but 
also among predictors. This higher sensitivity of causal 
learning compared with predictive learning with respect 
to stimulus competition cannot be explained by any contemporary 
model in its current form. According to associative 
models of learning (e.g., Dickinson & Burke, 
1996; Mackintosh, 1975; Miller & Matzel, 1988; Pearce 
& Hall, 1980; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Van Hamme & 
Wasserman, 1994; Wagner, 1981), learning consists of the 
formation and strengthening of associations between the 
representations of antecedent and subsequent events. 
These models do not differentiate between processing of 
these relationships as cue–O (predictive learning) or 
cause–effect (causal learning) relationships; therefore, 
they are silent concerning any difference between predictive 
and causal learning. 
 
The present results also pose problems for statistical 
models of human learning. Most of these models (e.g., 
Allan’s, 1980, unconditional ΔP; Cheng & Novick’s, 
1992, focal-set theory) do not try to differentially account 
for predictive and causal learning; rather, they are 
designed to explain covariation learning (i.e., learning 
whether the occurrence of one event covaries with the 
occurrence of another event) without differentiating it 
from either prediction or causation. Other models that 
have been explicitly developed in order to explain causal 
learning in humans (e.g., Cheng, 1997; Spellman, 1996) 
are also silent concerning predictive learning. According 
to these models, learning the covariation (i.e., as 
measured by the unconditional ΔP) among the stimuli is 
a necessary condition in order to learn different causal 
relations. Causation results exclusively from the history 
of training with certain covarying events and from controlling 
for alternative causes of the outcome. Controlling 
for the alternative causes takes the form of adjusting 
ΔP relative to the base-rate occurrence of the outcome 
[i.e., 1 -- P(O|noC)] in Cheng’s Power-PC model, and of 
the computation of a conditional contingency (i.e., the 
contingency of the target candidate cause relative to the 
contingency of the alternative candidate cause or causes) 
in Spellman’s model. Importantly, predictive learning is 
not equated with covariation learning in these models. 
Thus, these models are also silent on the difference between 
predictive and causal learning. 
 
Waldmann’s (1996, 2000, 2001) causal-model theory 
explicitly differentiates between causes and effects, but 
not between predictors and causes. In Waldmann’s 
causal-model view, the participants’ intrinsic knowledge 
concerning causal relationships (i.e., causes influence 
effects, but not vice versa) results in competition between 
causes, but not between effects. This directionality, 
independent of the order in which the events are presented, 
is the basis of the causal model. Although 
published versions of Waldmann’s model do not address 
the nature of predictors, it could explain the present results 
by assuming that, in contrast to causes (which are 
necessarily antecedent events for the outcome), predictors 
are effects that can be used to diagnose a cause. This 
possibility can be applied to our Experiment 2, in which 
several examples of animal behavior were used as predictors 
of a thunderstorm. If participants inferred that 
these patterns of animal behavior were indeed elicited by 
atmospheric conditions that preceded the thunderstorm 
(e.g., dogs barked in response to the impending thunderstorm), 
then no overshadowing should be observed in the 
predictive condition because, according to Waldmann’s 
causal model, only causes (but not effects), compete. 
 
In sum, most current models of human learning cannot 
explain the observed greater stimulus competition 
between causes than between predictors (but see De 
Houwer et al., 2002, for an account based on inferential 
reasoning). However, some current models could be 
adapted post hoc to explain these results. For example, 
statistical models (e.g., Cheng, 1997; Cheng & Novick, 
1992) could be adapted by using a weighted ΔP (see, 
e.g., Kao & Wasserman, 1993), in which each cell in the 
traditional 2 _ 2 contingency matrix is multiplied by a 
given value ranging from 0 to 1, and making the weights 
for the cells c (i.e., cue absent and outcome present) and 
d (i.e., both cue and outcome absent) higher for causal 
learning than for predictive learning. If the trials during 
which the target cue is absent are more heavily weighted 
for causal judgments than for predictive judgments, 
stimulus competition would be stronger in the former 
than in the latter case. Although this adaptation of ΔP 
could explain stronger blocking in causality than in predictive 
value, it still would face problems in explaining 
stronger overshadowing in causality than in predictive 
value because in a between-subjects overshadowing design 
there are no trials on which the target cue is absent. 
However, this is the case only with a between-groups 
methodology; with a within-subjects design such as the 
one we used in Experiment 2, the participants receive 
both AX-O and Y-O trials, and the Y-O trials constitute 
O trials without X present. 
 
Another model that could be adapted to account for 
these results is the comparator hypothesis (Miller & 
Matzel, 1988). According to this theory, overshadowing 
and other stimulus competition effects consist of impaired 
responding elicited by the target stimulus due to 
its previous training in compound with a competing 
stimulus. Specifically, this theory assumes that the presentation 
of the target stimulus, X, directly activates the 
representation of O (i.e., through the X–O association), 
as well as the representation of the competing stimulus, 
A (i.e., through an X–A within-compound association), 
which in turn indirectly activates the representation of O 
(i.e., through an A-O association). According to the 
comparator hypothesis, responding to X is based on a 
comparison between the strength of the direct activation 
of O (i.e., proportional to the strength of the X–O association) 
and the strength of the indirect activation of O 
(i.e., proportional to the product of the strengths of the 
X–A and A–O associations). The behavioral effect of the 
directly activated representation of the outcome is downmodulated 
by the indirectly activated representation of 
the outcome. Hence, a weak response to the target stimulus 
is observed in stimulus competition situations. In 
order to explain the results of the present experiments, 
this model could be adapted by assuming that the comparison 
process has greater impact on causal than on predictive 
responding. For example, if the value of the indirect 
activation of O is weighted so that it is larger in 
causal than in predictive learning (i.e., analogous to the 
case of cells c and d in the previous adaptation of ΔP), 
then the interference produced by the competing association 
on the expression of the target association would be 
stronger in causal judgment than in predictive judgment. 
More important, this adaptation of the comparator hypothesis, 
as well as the adapted ∆P, does not preclude 
the possibility of stimulus competition being observed 
between predictors. 
 
It must be pointed out that this post hoc adaptation of 
both the ∆P model (e.g., Allan, 1980) and the comparator 
hypothesis (Miller & Matzel, 1988) to explain the 
present results does not merely assume that causes are, 
per se, more susceptible to competition than are predictors. 
As indicated by the findings of Experiment 2, only 
the causal value of causes (i.e., as assessed by the causal 
test question) was strongly affected by a stimulus competition 
treatment (i.e., overshadowing in our experiment). 
This interaction between the nature of the stimuli 
(as predictors or causes) and the test question (as predictive 
or causal) suggests that causal responding, instead 
of causal learning, is highly susceptible to competition. 
This emphasis on responding rather than learning 
is consistent with our proposed modifications of these 
models. Obviously, because mere predictors lack a 
causal value, the weaker stimulus competition found between 
predictors than between causes can be explained 
by the intrinsic inability of predictors to support a causal 
response or rating. 
 
Of course, the ∆P model and the comparator hypothesis 
are not the only models that could be extended to account 
for the higher susceptibility of causal judgments, 
relative to predictive judgments, to stimulus competition. 
Models are flexible and they can encompass different 
post hoc adaptations to explain the present results. 
For example, traditional associative models (e.g., Rescorla 
& Wagner, 1972) could assume independent causal and 
predictive learning, with causal learning proceeding more 
rapidly than predictive learning (e.g., learning-rate parameters 
may have higher values in causal associative learning 
than in predictive associative learning). Applied to Experiment 
2, this principle anticipates greater overshadowing 
between causes than between predictors, at least 
after a few pairings of the AX compound with O, which 
is what was observed. In this framework, predictive test 
questions assess predictive learning and causal questions 
assess causal learning. 
 
In Experiment 2, overshadowing was observed only 
when the causal status of an antecedent event was assessed 
at test. Because participants received the predictive 
and causal test questions for the first time during the 
test phase, the test questions could not affect predictive 
or causal learning during the overshadowing treatment. 
Moreover, differences in competition between causes 
and between predictors have been observed for the same 
stimuli (e.g., Experiment 2), which means that the basis 
for the differential competition is present independently 
of the test question. This suggests (but certainly does not 
prove) that participants have different learning functions 
during training for predictive value and for causal value. 
However, even if this is correct, the actual competition 
could occur during training (i.e., an acquisition deficit) 
or during testing (i.e., a performance deficit). 
 
The general assumption that causal learning is a more 
selective process regarding stimulus competition than is 
predictive learning, although speculative, is interesting. 
As humans, we need to both predict and control the 
events that occur in our environment. In both predictive 
and causal learning, selecting the most reliable antecedent 
stimulus (i.e., either predictor or cause) of an 
event can be of critical importance for adaptative purposes. 
However, causal learning might be more sensitive 
to stimulus selection effects than predictive learning because, 
in order to efficiently influence the occurrence 
and/or intensity of an event, we must exactly identify and 
then manipulate its cause and avoid response competition 
arising from manipulating other candidate causes. In contrast, 
attending to both unique and redundant predictors 
to anticipate outcomes seemingly would not be as injurious. 
Alternatively worded, it is likely more difficult to simultaneously 
manipulate many causes than it is to simultaneously 
attend to many predictors. This would 
result in selection among candidate causes being a more 
rigorous process than selection among candidate predictors. 
As previously stated, this does not mean that no 
stimulus competition will ever occur among predictors. 
In fact, Experiment 2 revealed a tendency to stimulus 
competition among predictors. It simply implies that 
stimulus competition would be stronger in causal judgment 
than in predictive judgment. 
 
The evolutionary question is, thus, why has causal 
learning evolved as a more selective process than predictive 
learning? The answer to this question likely originates 
in predictors usually coming from the environment 
and causes often originating in our own instrumental behavior. 
More generally, learning about the relations between 
external events can be a form of either predictive 
or causal learning, whereas learning about the relations 
between our own responses and their consequences is 
causal by nature (see Dickinson, 2001). A corollary of 
this view is that competition among responses (e.g., response– 
outcome relations in instrumental conditioning) 
should be more readily observed than competition among 
stimuli. But such a comparison in a well-controlled situation 
has not yet been performed. The present study 
should be considered a first attempt to contrast two 
closely related types of learning, predictive and causal. 
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NOTES 
 
1. The four scenarios used in Experiments 1A and 1B were counterbalanced 
for order according to the following four different sequences: 
(1) Scenario 1, Scenario 2, Scenario 3, Scenario 4; (2) Scenario 2, Scenario 
1, Scenario 4, Scenario 3; (3) Scenario 3, Scenario 4, Scenario 1, 
Scenario 2; (4) Scenario 4, Scenario 3, Scenario 2, Scenario 1. 
 
2. The preparation used in Experiment 2 is available at http://www. 
opineno.com/task.htm. 
 
3. A submaximal intensity of the outcome (i.e., 10/20) was used in 
Experiment 2 to facilitate the observation of cue competition between 
A and X relative to Y (see De Houwer et al., 2002, for a rationale). 
  
APPENDIX 
 
Instructions Used in the Experiments 
 
EXPERIMENTS 1A AND 1B 
 
 
First Screen 
 
In this portion of the experiment, you will be required to learn about various causes and 
predictors. A cause is something that PRODUCES or brings about an effect, whereas a 
predictor is something that SIGNALS a future event. Thus, a predictor may or may not also be a 
cause of the effect. Please read all of the material on each screen carefully before you proceed 
to the next screen. Periodically, you will be asked to answer several questions, using the mouse 
to indicate your answer. Simply move the mouse along the rating scale and click on your 
chosen rating (you can use either the left or the right mouse button to select your rating). 
 
Scenario Screens 
 
Scenario 1: Naval artillery. Pretend that you are on-board a Naval destroyer in order to 
observe an artillery demonstration. For this demonstration the gunner is firing shells at a distant 
target. Each time that the gunner fires a shell, you will observe the shell casing being ejected 
from the gun and you can also look through your binoculars to observe whether the target has 
been hit. Other ships are also performing similar demonstrations. Although they are firing at 
different targets, sometimes their shells will go off course and hit your ship’s target. Please try to 
determine the relationships between the events. 
 
Scenario 2: Auto factory. Pretend that you have recently been hired to work in the quality 
control division of an auto factory. As part of your job, you are asked to investigate an increase 
in the rate of defective car bumpers. The car bumpers are manufactured from steel sheets, 
some of which might be imperfect. As the sheets proceed through the assembly line, a machine 
designed to detect flaws in the steel sheets sounds an alarm to alert the assembly line workers 
that an imperfect sheet exists. If the alarm sounds, the workers are supposed to remove the 
imperfect sheet to prevent a defective bumper from being produced. The workers’ supervisor 
blames the workers for not removing the defective steel sheets when the alarm is sounded, 
whereas the workers claim that faulty wiring in the bumper stamping machine, which results in 
power fluctuations, is the real cause of the defective bumpers. Please try to determine the 
relationships between the events. 
 
Scenario 3: Greenhouse. Pretend that you own a floral supply house that distributes flowers to 
several local florists. Recently, you hired a new employee to help you in the greenhouse and 
have been trying to determine if the employee has been doing his job. Each day the employee 
is supposed to water the flowers for one hour. If the employee waters the flowers as instructed, 
the flowers should bloom the next day. To water the flowers, the employee turns on a switch 
that automatically waters them for one hour. Although you are not always present when the 
employee waters the flowers, you can tell if he has done so by whether or not the floor is wet. 
However, another employee occasionally fertilizes the flowers, which can also make the flowers 
bloom the next day. Please try to determine the relationships between the events. 
 
Scenario 4: Strawberries. Pretend that you are a doctor who has been asked to investigate an 
increase in allergic asthma cases on a produce farm. As you tour the farm, you will see the 
workers loading crates of fruit onto trucks. You suspect that several of the fruits are responsible 
for the workers’ asthma attacks. As you examine each worker for wheezing symptomatic of 
asthma, you notice that the shoes of some of the workers are stained from the fruits. Some 
workers shoes are stained red from strawberries and others are stained blue from blueberries. 
Please try to determine the relationships between the events. 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
The National Weather Service (NWS) has opened a number of training positions for research in 
meteorology. Since you are very interested in enrolling in the NWS (meteorology is your life and 
their salaries are very appealing), you are going to apply for a position. As a part of this process, 
you are required to take a computer-based test, which consists of determining the relationships 
among different events presented on the screen of the computer. Therefore, you have to pay 
attention to those events so you can then rate their relations . . . and obtain a good grade in 
your exam. 
 
Before taking the exam, it is important for you to remember the difference between causes and 
predictors. A cause is something that produces or brings about an effect, whereas a predictor is 
something that only signals a future event. 
 
Remember: You will have to rate the relations among the different events based on your 
experience with them during the computer-based test. 
 
Good luck! 
 
